By Oyesoji
Aremu
The greatest contemporary challenge to national security in Nigeria is the insurgency orchestrated by the sect called Boko Haram. Not until 2009, insurgency and its concomitant effects (both emotional and physical) were alien to Nigeria. Nigeria, most especially, the north eastern regions of the country; and of recent, in Abuja, there has been ceaseless terrorist attacks.
Terrorism as unleashed by Boko Haram has primarily targeted government security agencies, most especially the police. With over five decades of nationhood, Nigeria has never witnessed the kind of insurgency that has engulfed the country in the last five years. The post-presidential election of 2011 and the concomitant uproar it generated most especially in the northern part of the country fuelled the upsurge of insurgency. The Federal
Government of Nigeria did not initially; take interest in the activities of the sect until 2009 when intelligence reports showed that the group had the potential of being dangerous to the general safety and welfare of Nigerian’s citizens.
Although the group was labelled as a terrorist organization in 2011 after the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, the actual classification of the group as a terrorist group associated with Al-Qaida did not occur until November 2013 by the United States government. This did not go down well with the Federal Government of Nigeria in spite of the fact the country continues to be mentioned on the ‘Terrorist Radar’ in the
United States of America and Europe. I wouldn’t know if the Federal Government of Nigeria now shares the sentiment of the label on Boko Haram?
Certainly, this is not the best of times for the Federal Government of Nigeria. Not with the colossal loss of human lives and kidnapping of the school girls. Given the timeline of Boko Haram between January this year and date, is to say the least, wiping away thousands of lives. And with the failure of intelligence on the part of the security personnel, one then wonder how the insurgency can be curtailed.
In other climes, terrorism and insurgency have been successfully tackled through effective counter insurgency and significant intelligence collection. It is therefore relevant to examine the lessons drawn from other countries. Countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa have successfully curtailed terrorism and insurgency using a number of human and military tactics. Specifically, counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism in such countries have more often than not been tailored to specific ideological beliefs, with emphasis on intelligence gathering and information exchange.
Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria has forced the Federal Government through the Office of the National Security Adviser to be more tactical and intelligence-driven. The coordination is mutually inclusive of all security agencies in Nigeria. This notwithstanding, the primary responsibility of the police in ensuring peace and order cannot be downplayed. Another stratagem would include “intelligence-led policing” (ILP). Although ILP as a concept has gained currency in academic literature in recent times, its acceptance among police scholars and practitioners is laudable and of tremendous importance as an intervention tool for security enhancement.
ILP as a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations combined with community-oriented policing and problem-solving. In effect, ILP can be explained as police and community collaboration for effective security interventions. The new paradigm in public safety is to enable the police to make good use of the community for intelligence gathering and exchange. This becomes imperative given the fact that COIN cannot be effective without direct community involvement.
As it is presently, the Nigerian Police can be said to be ineffective and public trust in the agency has waned. Without public confidence, it has been difficult for the police to engage in ILP. The war against terrorism is also not achieving the desired result because the approach is not intelligence and information-based, but rather, it can be said to be driven by emotions and political sentiment. Even with the enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 (amended in 2013), which stipulated the death penalty for terrorists and their accomplices; the rate of terrorist events has been on the increase.
It is therefore recommended that the approach to addressing and curbing insurgency should be multidimensional and eclectic. Although the joint interventions of the police and military appear to be going in the right direction, this should be strategically driven and coordinated, and supported by the unmitigated cooperation of the public. The war on terrorism across the globe has been shown to be difficult to win. However, with adequate training, funding, motivation, and public support and confidence, this challenge could be mitigated. And public cooperation is clearly the key to successful counterinsurgent planning and crime control and terrorism eradication initiatives.
Prof. Aremu is of the Department of Guidance & Counselling at the University of Ibadan
